flytachi / jwt
A modern, secure, and strictly-typed PHP library for encoding and decoding JSON Web Tokens (JWT) with JWK support.
Package info
pkg:composer/flytachi/jwt
Requires
- php: >=8.1
- ext-json: *
- ext-openssl: *
Requires (Dev)
- phpunit/phpunit: @stable
- squizlabs/php_codesniffer: @stable
README
A strictly-typed PHP library for issuing and verifying JSON Web Tokens, with JWKS support
and no dependencies beyond ext-openssl and ext-json.
Tokens it issues are accepted by other implementations, and tokens from other implementations are accepted by it — the test suite verifies the examples printed in RFC 7515 itself, so interoperability is a checked property rather than an intention.
Installation
composer require flytachi/jwt
Requires PHP 8.1+, ext-openssl and ext-json.
Quick start
use Flytachi\Jwt\JWT; use Flytachi\Jwt\Entity\JwtPayload; use Flytachi\Jwt\Entity\PrivateKey; use Flytachi\Jwt\Entity\PublicKey; $token = JWT::encode( new JwtPayload([ 'iss' => 'https://example.com', 'sub' => 'user-12345', 'aud' => 'https://api.example.com', 'iat' => time(), 'exp' => time() + 3600, ]), new PrivateKey('a-shared-secret', 'HS256'), ); $payload = JWT::decode($token, [new PublicKey('a-shared-secret', 'HS256')]); $userId = $payload->getClaim('sub');
Everything that can go wrong throws one type, JWTException: a malformed string, an
unsupported algorithm, a key that does not match, a signature that does not verify, an
expiry that has passed. One catch covers the lot.
Algorithms
alg |
Family | Key material | Signature |
|---|---|---|---|
HS256 HS384 HS512 |
HMAC | shared secret string | hash width |
RS256 RS384 RS512 |
RSA | OpenSSL key pair | key width |
ES256 |
ECDSA, P-256 | OpenSSL key pair | 64 bytes |
ES384 |
ECDSA, P-384 | OpenSSL key pair | 96 bytes |
ES512 |
ECDSA, P-521 | OpenSSL key pair | 132 bytes |
ECDSA signatures travel as the raw pair R || S, each component padded to the width of
the curve (RFC 7515 §3.4) — not as the ASN.1 DER structure OpenSSL produces. The library
converts in both directions, so a token that leaves here is readable anywhere.
Asymmetric keys
$token = JWT::encode( new JwtPayload(['sub' => 'user-12345']), new PrivateKey(openssl_pkey_get_private($pem), 'RS256', 'key-2024'), ); $payload = JWT::decode($token, ['key-2024' => new PublicKey($publicKey, 'RS256')]);
The algorithm travels with the key, and a token whose header names a different one is
refused. That is what closes the algorithm-confusion attack, where an RS256 token is
re-signed with the public key as an HMAC secret.
Which key verifies a token
kid is optional under RFC 7515 §4.1.4, and one rule covers every algorithm:
| In the header | Passed to decode() |
Result |
|---|---|---|
kid present |
a key under that id | that key is used |
kid present |
no such id | refused |
no kid |
exactly one key | that key is used |
no kid |
several keys | refused |
A named key is used or none is — there is no falling back to another, so a token cannot
influence what verifies it. Several keys with no kid are refused rather than resolved by
array order.
JWKS
$jwks = json_decode(file_get_contents('https://accounts.google.com/.well-known/jwks.json'), true); $keys = JWK::parseKeySet($jwks); // ['kid' => PublicKey, …] $payload = JWT::decode($token, $keys);
JWK::parseKey() handles RSA, EC and oct keys and builds the PEM itself, with no
ASN.1 library involved. Each key remembers its own kid, so a key taken out of the set
still knows which one it is.
Keys carrying a kid land under it; keys without one are appended under a numeric index,
since kid is optional in a JWK too (RFC 7517 §4.5). A key the library cannot parse is
skipped rather than fatal — a provider mid-rotation may publish a type not everyone
handles, and refusing the whole set would stop verification for every token.
Cache the fetched set: parseKeySet() does no I/O and no caching of its own.
What is verified, and what is not
Verified: the signature; that the key's algorithm matches the token's alg; and the time
claims exp, nbf and iat, each widened by the $leeway seconds you pass.
JWT::decode($token, $keys, leeway: 30); // tolerate 30s of clock skew
Not verified: iss, aud, sub, scopes, revocation. Those depend on your application,
and a library that guessed at them would be wrong quietly. Read them from the payload and
check them yourself:
if ($payload->getClaim('iss') !== 'https://example.com') { throw new RuntimeException('Unexpected issuer.'); }
Documentation
- Quickstart — first token, signed and verified
- Algorithms — the nine, and what each needs
- Asymmetric keys — RSA, ECDSA, key selection
- Verifying with JWKS — provider key sets
- Security model — what is refused, and why
- API reference — every class and argument
Development
composer test # phpunit composer cs-check # phpcs, PSR-12 composer cs-fix
The suite covers all nine algorithms end to end, checks the bytes an ECDSA signature is made of rather than only the round trip, and verifies the RFC 7515 Appendix A examples — tokens this library did not produce.
License
MIT — see LICENSE.