jp3cki/totp

RFC 6238 / TOTP: Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm

v4.0.0 2026-05-28 09:20 UTC

Requires

• php: >= 8.2
• php-64bit: >= 8.2
• ext-hash: *
• paragonie/constant_time_encoding: ^3.0

Requires (Dev)

• ergebnis/composer-normalize: ^2.45
• jp3cki/coding-standard: ^2.0.0
• phpstan/phpstan: ^2.1.10
• phpunit/phpunit: ^11.5.55
• squizlabs/php_codesniffer: ^3.12.0

MIT

• AIZAWA Hina

• password
• otp
• totp
• rfc6238
• onetime

README

PHP implementation of RFC6238 (TOTP: Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm).

Requirements

• PHP (64-bits): PHP 8.2 or later
• PHP Extensions: hash

Install

1. Set up Composer, the de facto standard package manager.
2. php composer.phar require jp3cki/totp

Usage

<?php

declare(strict_types=1);

use jp3cki\totp\Totp;

require_once('vendor/autoload.php');

// Generate new shared-secret key (for each user)
$secret = Totp::generateKey();
echo "secret: {$secret}\n";
echo "\n";

// Make URI for importing from QRCode.
$uri = Totp::createKeyUriForGoogleAuthenticator($secret, '[e-mail]', 'Issuer Name');
echo "uri: {$uri}\n";
echo "\n";

// Verify user input
$userInput = '123456'; // $_POST['totp']
$isValid = Totp::verify($userInput, $secret, time());
var_dump($isValid);

Security Notes

• Replay protection is the caller's responsibility. Totp::verify() does not remember which one-time codes have already been used. Per RFC 6238 §5.2, a server MUST reject any TOTP value that was previously accepted within the validity window. Store the most recently accepted time-step (or the accepted code itself) per user, and reject any submission that is equal to or older than it.
• Rate-limit verification attempts. A 6-digit code with the default ±1-step window leaves roughly 3 codes valid at any moment, i.e. a 3-in-1,000,000 chance per guess. Without throttling, an attacker can brute force a valid code in minutes. Apply per-account lockout or exponential back-off in the calling application.
• Restrict the hash algorithm to RFC 6238 values. The library only accepts sha1, sha256, and sha512. Do not forward an untrusted hash parameter into calc() / verify() from user input.

License

The MIT License.

Copyright (c) 2015-2026 AIZAWA Hina <[e-mail]>

Contributing

Patches and/or report issues are welcome.

• Please create new branch for each issue or feature. (should not work in master branch)
• Please write and run test. $ make test
• Please run check-style for static code analysis and coding rule checking. $ make check-style
• Please clean up commits.
• Please create new pull-request for each issue or feature.
• Please use Japanese or very simple English to create new pull-request or issue.

Breaking Changes

• v4.0.0

  • Minimum environment is now PHP 8.2
  • Totp::calc() and Totp::verify() no longer accept arbitrary hash algorithms from hash_algos(). Only sha1, sha256, and sha512 (the algorithms defined by RFC 6238) are allowed; any other value now throws InvalidArgumentException. Callers that previously passed values such as md5 or crc32 must switch to one of the supported algorithms.
  • The default verification window of Totp::verify() is narrowed. $acceptStepPast now defaults to 1 (was 2), matching the maximum drift recommended by RFC 6238 §5.2. To restore the previous behaviour, pass $acceptStepPast: 2 explicitly.
  • Totp::generateKey() now defaults to a 160-bit shared secret (was 80 bits), matching the HMAC-SHA1 output length recommended by RFC 4226 §4 R6. Existing keys keep working; only newly generated keys are longer. Pass Totp::generateKey(80) to restore the previous size.

• v3.0.0

  • Minimum environment is now PHP 8.1

• v2.0.0

  • Minimum environment is now PHP 7.2
  • Argument types are now strictly enforced
  • Removed Random::generate*(). Always use random_bytes() now.