README

The PHP SDK for the allus company-data API. Point it at a JSON config file and it hands back typed, plaintext, your-slug-keyed conclusions: for each connected person, a map of your request-field slug → plaintext value (plus whether the value is live and when it last changed).

The SDK hides everything else — the OAuth token, the field catalog, the id plumbing, the hybrid decryption, binary fetching, the changes-queue mechanics, JSON-vs-XML. The platform is zero-knowledge: the API only ever holds ciphertext, so all decryption happens inside the SDK with your service private key. The person's own field choices are never exposed — you only ever see the request slots you configured.

This SDK is one of six language ports that share an identical API surface. This manual is the PHP view of it.

Example: one runnable website demonstrating this SDK lives in examples/ — one command (composer start) and a browser. It serves all three scenario families as sections of a single portal: identity (Sign in with allme, OIDC login, 2FA by allme), company-data (connections read, request fields, the change feed, webhooks, documents), and flow (contract flows driven end-to-end). See its README.

Contents: TL;DR — fetch new updates · Quickstart · Every call · The typed value model · The changes pump · Webhooks · Rate limits · Errors · How it's wired

Deeper reference pages live in docs/: config · model · pump · webhooks · errors.

TL;DR — fetch new updates

composer require allus/company-data

Point a config.json at your service keys:

{
  "api_url": "https://api.allme.fyi",
  "client_id": "svc_xxx",
  "client_secret": "xxx",
  "service_private_key": "/path/to/service.pem",
  "key_passphrase": "xxx",
  "cache_dir": "./allus-cache"
}

Drain everything new, handled one update at a time:

<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';

use Allus\CompanyData\Client;
use Allus\CompanyData\Model\Change;

$client = Client::fromConfig('config.json');

$client->processChanges(function (Change $change): void {
    // one update at a time: event, person, slug, value, live, at
    printf("%s %s %s %s %s %s\n",
        $change->event, $change->personId, $change->slug ?? '—',
        is_scalar($change->value) ? (string) $change->value : '…',
        $change->live ? 'live' : 'snapshot',
        $change->at?->format('c') ?? '—',
    );
});   // returns when the feed is empty

processChanges pulls every pending change, decrypts it, and hands them to your callback ONE BY ONE, acking each only after your code returns. Crash mid-batch? The next run replays exactly what wasn't acked — nothing is lost, and the API keeps no backlog of its own. Run it on a schedule (cron / systemd timer); there is no daemon/follow mode by design. Connections, binary values, and webhooks are documented below.

Quickstart

Requires PHP ≥ 8.1, with ext-openssl and ext-json (both standard).

composer require allus/company-data
# or, working from this repo:  composer install     # from the repo root
php -r 'require "vendor/autoload.php"; echo Allus\CompanyData\Client::class, PHP_EOL;'

The package is PSR-4 autoloaded (namespace Allus\CompanyData\ → src/), so require 'vendor/autoload.php' and you're done — no manual includes.

1. Write a config file

A single JSON file holds everything. Any field can be overridden by an ALLUS_* env var, so secrets needn't live in the file. No SDK method ever takes a key, passphrase, or secret as an argument — they all come from here.

allus.json:

{
  "api_url": "https://api.allme.fyi",
  "client_id": "svc_1a2b3c…",
  "client_secret": "…",
  "service_private_key": "./service-CRM.pem",
  "key_passphrase": "…",

  "account_private_key": "./account.pem",
  "account_passphrase": "…",

  "webhooks": {
    "wh_abc123": "hmac_secret_for_that_webhook"
  },

  "cache_dir": "./allus-cache",
  "format": "json"
}

Field	Required	Meaning
`api_url`	yes	API base, e.g. `https://api.allme.fyi`.
`client_id` / `client_secret`	yes	The registered `client_credentials` credentials for one service.
`service_private_key`	yes	Path to the OpenSSL-encrypted PKCS#8 PEM you downloaded from the portal.
`key_passphrase`	yes	Decrypts that PEM in memory at startup.
`account_private_key` / `account_passphrase`	only for `encrypt_payload` webhooks	The company account key, used to unwrap an encrypted webhook envelope.
`webhooks` / `webhook_secret`	webhook auth — HMAC (default)	Per-webhook HMAC secrets keyed by webhook id (matched via the `X-Allus-Webhook-Id` header). A single-webhook service can use a flat `"webhook_secret": "…"` instead of the map.
`webhook_bearer_token`	webhook auth — bearer	Verify `Authorization: Bearer <token>` deliveries.
`webhook_basic`	webhook auth — basic	`{"username","password"}` — verify HTTP Basic deliveries.
`webhook_header`	webhook auth — header	`{"name","value"}` — verify a custom-header delivery.
`webhook_auth_none`	webhook auth — none	`true` — explicit opt-out; `verifyWebhook` always passes (use only behind your own gateway). Configure at most one webhook auth method (two+ → `ConfigError`).
`cache_dir`	no (default `./allus-cache`)	Durable local buffer for the changes pump. Must be writable + durable.
`format`	no (default `json`)	Wire format `json` or `xml`. Invisible in the output.

Env overrides use the ALLUS_ prefix of the field name, e.g. ALLUS_CLIENT_SECRET, ALLUS_KEY_PASSPHRASE, ALLUS_ACCOUNT_PASSPHRASE, ALLUS_WEBHOOK_SECRET. A missing/invalid config (or an unreadable PEM / wrong passphrase) throws ConfigError at construction — fail fast.

2. First call — list a connection's values

<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';

use Allus\CompanyData\Client;

$client = Client::fromConfig('allus.json');

// Iterate every connected person (lazy, auto-paged Generator).
foreach ($client->connections() as $conn) {
    echo $conn->displayName, ' ', $conn->personId, PHP_EOL;
    foreach ($conn->values as $slug => $val) {
        printf("  %s = %s  (live=%s, updated=%s)\n",
            $slug,
            is_scalar($val->value) ? (string) $val->value : json_encode($val->value),
            $val->live ? 'true' : 'false',
            $val->updatedAt?->format('c') ?? '—',
        );
    }
    break; // just the first one for the demo
}

Or fetch one connection by id:

$conn  = $client->connection('019xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx');
$email = $conn->values['work_email']->value;   // "alice@acme.com"  (a string)

$client = Client::fromEnv(); builds the same client entirely from ALLUS_* env vars (no file).

Every call

Client is the only object you construct. Build it from config, then:

Client::fromConfig(string $path, ?HttpClient $http = null, ?Logger $logger = null, ?callable $sleep = null): Client
Client::fromEnv(?HttpClient $http = null, ?Logger $logger = null, ?callable $sleep = null): Client

The optional args are advanced: $http (an injected HttpClient), $logger (a Allus\CompanyData\Pump\Logger), $sleep (a callable(float): void, for tests).

`requestFields()`

requestFields(): array  // list<RequestField>

Your request-field definitions — fetched once from GET /api/company-data/request-fields and cached for the life of the client (it types every value). Returns your request config, never the person's fields.

Params: none.
Returns: list<RequestField> — each RequestField has slug, label, type, oneTime, mandatory, raw. mandatory is true when the field is mandatory-to-provide or mandatory-to-stay-connected.
Throws: AuthError, ApiError, RateLimitError.

foreach ($client->requestFields() as $f) {
    $flag = $f->mandatory ? 'mandatory' : 'optional';
    printf("%-20s %-10s %s%s\n", $f->slug, $f->type, $flag, $f->oneTime ? ' (one-time)' : '');
}

`connections(limit, offset)`

connections(int $limit = 100, int $offset = 0): \Generator   // Generator<Connection>

A lazy generator that auto-pages GET /api/company-data/connections?limit&offset and yields one typed Connection at a time (bounded memory for a large book). Each $conn->values[$slug] is already decrypted (or a lazy binary handle).

Params: $limit — page size (default 100); $offset — starting offset.
Returns: \Generator<int, Connection>.
Throws: AuthError, ApiError, DecryptError (per value, at access), RateLimitError (after the iterator's bounded internal backoff — see Rate limits).

Heavily rate-limited. Use for the initial full sync + occasional reconciliation only — never as a poll substitute for the changes feed. The generator paces itself within the limit (backs off on Retry-After).

// Initial full sync, streaming so a 100k-connection book never lands in memory.
foreach ($client->connections(limit: 200) as $conn) {
    upsertLocalRecord($conn);
}

`connection(id)`

connection(string $id): Connection

Fetch one connection by its connection id (GET /api/company-data/connections/{id}).

Params: $id — the connection id (Connection->id).
Returns: one Connection. Note: this endpoint returns {connection_id, user_id, values} and no display_name/connected_at, so those identity fields are null here (the list endpoint carries them).
Throws: AuthError, ApiError (404 if unknown), DecryptError, RateLimitError.

$conn  = $client->connection($connId);
$phone = $conn->values['mobile'] ?? null;
if ($phone !== null) {
    echo $phone->value, ' ', $phone->live ? 'live' : 'snapshot', PHP_EOL;
}

`logs(limit, offset)`

logs(int $limit = 50, int $offset = 0): array   // list<LogEntry>

The service's activity log (GET /api/company-data/logs?limit&offset) — ops events only (email / purge / webhook), never person field data.

Params: $limit (default 50), $offset (default 0).
Returns: list<LogEntry> — each LogEntry has type, message, metadata, at, raw.
Throws: AuthError, ApiError, RateLimitError.

foreach ($client->logs(limit: 20) as $entry) {
    echo $entry->at?->format('c'), ' ', $entry->type, ' ', $entry->message, PHP_EOL;
}

`processChanges(handler, ...$options)`

processChanges(
    callable $handler,                 // callable(Change): void
    int $batchSize = 100,              // clamped to ≤ 500
    int $maxRetries = 3,
    string $onError = 'deadletter',    // 'deadletter' | 'halt'
    ?callable $backoff = null,         // callable(int $attempt): float (seconds)
): void

The crash-safe changes pump: drains the feed through $handler one Change at a time, durably buffering each batch before delivery, with per-item ack and retry → dead-letter → continue. Runs until the feed is empty, then returns — there is no follow/daemon mode (you schedule re-runs yourself). Delivery is at-least-once, so your handler must be idempotent (dedup on Change->id). See The changes pump for the full model.

Params: $handler — your callback; called with one Change. A normal return is an ack; a thrown exception triggers retry.
Options: $batchSize (clamped to ≤ 500, default 100), $maxRetries (default 3), $onError ('deadletter' — default — or 'halt'), $backoff (callable(int): float, attempt → seconds).
Returns: void (when the feed is empty + the buffer is drained).
Throws: AuthError, ApiError, RateLimitError (during a drain); InvalidArgumentException (bad $onError); whatever the handler throws if $onError='halt' and retries are exhausted.

$client->processChanges(function (\Allus\CompanyData\Model\Change $change): void {
    if (alreadyProcessed($change->id)) {   // idempotency — dedup on the stable id
        return;
    }
    match ($change->event) {
        'field_updated'                       => store($change->personId, $change->slug, $change->value),
        'field_deleted', 'connection_deleted' => remove($change->personId, $change->slug),
        default                               => null,
    };
    markProcessed($change->id);
});                                          // returns when the feed is empty

$logger is not a processChanges option in this SDK — pass it once to the Client constructor (Client::fromConfig('allus.json', logger: $myLogger)).

Advanced changes primitives

drainBatch(int $max = 100): array                      // list<Change> — raw, UNBUFFERED (you own durability)
deadLetters(): array                                   // list<array> — the local dead-letter store
retryDeadLetters(callable $handler, ...$options): int  // re-drive dead-lettered events; returns count re-driven

drainBatch($max) — fetches one batch (clamped ≤ 500) and returns the decrypted Changes directly. It does not persist anything, so a crash loses what the API already deleted. Prefer processChanges for safe consumption.
deadLetters() — each entry is the stored (ciphertext) event plus a flattened error and attempts (and the event's id).
retryDeadLetters($handler, ...) — same $maxRetries / $onError / $backoff options as processChanges; on success a record is removed, on repeated failure it stays dead-lettered (or re-throws under 'halt'). Dead letters are never re-fetched from the API — the local store is their only home.

foreach ($client->deadLetters() as $dl) {
    printf("stuck: %s %s after %d attempts\n", $dl['id'], $dl['error'], $dl['attempts']);
}

$n = $client->retryDeadLetters($handler);   // after you've fixed the bug
echo "re-drove {$n} dead letters", PHP_EOL;

Key rotation — `key_rotated` and the public-key cache

Every client caches the RSA public keys it fetches: a person's key is immutable — until they rotate it. A person learns of a rotation from a silent push; your service gets no pushes, so the key_rotated change is your only signal. Without it a long-running worker keeps encrypting to the rotated-away key for its whole lifetime, and the person can never read those values.

On the pump this is automatic — the cached key is dropped as the change passes through, before your handler sees it. Over a webhook it is not: the signature verifier is static and has no client instance, so it cannot reach the cache. Call the invalidator yourself — noting that the two clients key their caches differently: the service client by share_code, the customer client by the person's user id. Passing a share code to the customer client removes nothing and leaves you encrypting to the old key. Both identifiers ride every change, alongside public_key_sha256 — the fingerprint of the person's new key.

if ($change->event === 'key_rotated') {
    $client->invalidatePublicKey($change->shareCode);     // service Client — keyed by SHARE CODE
    $customer->invalidatePublicKey($change->personId);    // CustomerClient — keyed by PERSON USER ID
    // $change->publicKeySha256 = fingerprint of the NEW key, if you want to verify the refetch
}

This is eventual, not fail-closed — nothing rejects a document encrypted to a stale key, so a window remains between the rotation and your next drain. Drain often if that window matters.

`service_key_rotated` — the same thing, the other way round

The customer client also caches the service's public key, the one you encrypt your consent answers and documents to, keyed "companyCode/serviceCode". When that company replaces its service keypair, the service_key_rotated change on your account feed is your only signal — you receive no pushes. Same shape, same guarantees, same automatic handling on the pump:

if ($change->event === 'service_key_rotated') {
    // Automatic on the pump. Over a webhook, from the raw event body:
    $customer->invalidateServiceKey($body['company_share_code'], $body['service_share_code']);
    // $body['service_public_key_sha256'] = fingerprint of the service's NEW key
}

Also eventual, not fail-closed. Note the identifiers are share codes, not the ids used by invalidatePublicKey — the two caches are keyed differently and the wrong call removes nothing.

Webhook helpers (on the client)

The webhook receiver helpers are also exposed as Client methods (they delegate to Allus\CompanyData\Webhooks\Webhooks, fully config-driven — no key/secret arguments):

$client->verifyWebhook(string $rawBody, array $headers): bool
$client->parseWebhook(string $rawBody, array $headers):  Change
$client->handleWebhook(string $rawBody, array $headers): Change   // verify + parse

verifyWebhook — recomputes HMAC-SHA256($rawBody, secret) and constant-time-compares it (hash_equals) to X-Allus-Signature. Returns true/false; never throws for a bad signature.
parseWebhook — body → a typed Change. Does not verify. Handles JSON, XML, and the encrypt_payload account-key envelope. Throws WebhookError on a malformed/unparseable body.
handleWebhook — verify then parse; throws WebhookError on a bad/unknown signature, otherwise returns the Change. The typical one-liner inside a route.

The same three are available as static functions on Allus\CompanyData\Webhooks\Webhooks, which take the Config and the decrypt/type closures explicitly — but inside an app you'll almost always use the client methods. See Webhooks.

Company documents

The service can also publish documents — contracts, statements, terms, or any structured/binary payload — either broadcast to everyone connected or addressed to one person. The encryption rule is simple and automatic:

A per-person document is ALWAYS end-to-end encrypted to that recipient's public key — for any value of is_private. The SDK fetches the recipient key (from the share_code, or resolved from the connection_id / person_user_id) and encrypts before sending. As always, no method takes a key or secret argument — keys come from your config.
A broadcast document (no target) is plaintext. It cannot be locked, so is_private=true without a per-person target throws ConfigError.
is_private is device-display-only (it tells the recipient's app to show a lock / decrypt-on-load instead of rendering inline) — it does not change the value shape or whether encryption happens. Per-person ⇒ encrypted, broadcast ⇒ plaintext, regardless of is_private.

payload_kind is either 'json' (a structured value) or 'file' (raw bytes, optionally with a MIME type; for 'file' the metadata row is created first, then the bytes are uploaded — encrypted for a per-person target, raw for a broadcast).

`createDocument(array $opts)`

createDocument(array $opts): Document

use Allus\CompanyData\Client;

$client = Client::fromConfig('allus.json');

// A BROADCAST plaintext JSON document — visible to everyone connected, no target.
$terms = $client->createDocument([
    'name'         => 'Terms of Service v3',
    'payload_kind' => 'json',
    'json_value'   => ['version' => 3, 'effective' => '2026-07-01', 'url' => 'https://acme.example/tos'],
    // no connection_id / person_user_id  → broadcast → plaintext
    // is_private MUST stay false here (a broadcast can't be locked)
]);
echo $terms->id, ' ', $terms->status, PHP_EOL;

// A PER-PERSON document — automatically end-to-end encrypted to the recipient.
// Address it with ONE of: connection_id, person_user_id, or share_code.
$contract = $client->createDocument([
    'name'          => 'Service Agreement',
    'payload_kind'  => 'json',
    'json_value'    => ['plan' => 'pro', 'monthly' => 4900, 'currency' => 'EUR'],
    'connection_id' => $someConnectionId,   // or 'person_user_id' => …, or 'share_code' => 'AB12CD'
    'is_private'    => true,                 // device-display-only; encryption happens regardless
    'status'        => 'offering',
    'metadata'      => ['ref' => 'AGR-2026-118'],
]);

// Read a per-person JSON document back — decryption happens transparently with
// the SDK's own service key (only for the per-person, encrypted shape):
$plain = $client->document($contract->id)->json();   // ['plan' => 'pro', …]

// A file document (raw bytes). Per-person → encrypted; broadcast → plaintext.
// plain_sha256 (SHA-256 of the raw PDF bytes) is computed from file_bytes via
// Crypto::computePlainSha256() when not given explicitly — required by the
// server for a signable file document (requires_signature/requires_acceptance),
// optional for any other, ignored for payload_kind='json'.
$signed = $client->createDocument([
    'name'               => 'Signed PDF',
    'payload_kind'       => 'file',
    'file_bytes'         => file_get_contents('/tmp/agreement.pdf'),
    'file_mime'          => 'application/pdf',
    'person_user_id'     => $personUserId,        // per-person → bytes encrypted on upload
    'requires_signature' => true,
    // 'plain_sha256' => Crypto::computePlainSha256($fileBytes), // optional — computed otherwise
]);

Options (associative array): name (required), payload_kind ('json'|'file', required), is_private (default false), kind (default 'document'), description, status, metadata, plain_sha256 ('file' only), and one target — connection_id, person_user_id, or share_code (omit all three for a broadcast). For 'json': json_value. For 'file': file_bytes (+ optional file_mime).
Returns: the created Document.
Throws: ConfigError (missing name, bad payload_kind, is_private=true with no target, or a missing json_value/file_bytes); AuthError, ApiError, RateLimitError.

The document seal. A Document also carries plainSha256 (SHA-256 of the unencrypted PDF bytes, null on a json document and on a file document with no stored plaintext hash) and sealedAt (null until a seal actually succeeds). Completing every required signature/acceptance on a signable document is not the same as sealing it: when the last one is recorded the platform attempts, on that same request, to append a Signatures page and sign the whole PDF with a platform certificate, replacing every party's copy with the sealed one — but the attempt can fail (no PDF bytes on the completing act, a byte mismatch, the sealing service unavailable, or a custodian-completed ward act) without affecting the signatures or the document's completed status. It is then simply left unsealed, and any party can seal it afterwards from their own device or the owning company's portal (no SDK call triggers a seal). Each Document::$signatures entry additionally carries plain_sha256, signer_first_name, signer_last_name and signer_name_verified beside its existing action/method/content_sha256/ip/user_agent/created_at keys.

`listDocuments(...)` / `document($id)`

listDocuments(?string $personUserId = null, ?string $status = null, int $limit = 100, int $offset = 0): array  // list<Document>
document(string $documentId): Document
documentFile(string $documentId): string   // #491: the file BYTES

foreach ($client->listDocuments(status: 'active', limit: 50) as $doc) {
    echo $doc->id, ' ', $doc->name, ' [', $doc->status, ']', PHP_EOL;
}

$doc = $client->document($documentId);
$value = $doc->payloadKind === 'json' ? $doc->json() : $doc->value;   // json() decrypts per-person docs

listDocuments filters optionally by personUserId and/or status and pages with limit/offset.
document($id) fetches one. Call ->json() on a 'json' document to get the plaintext (it transparently decrypts a per-person, encrypted document; a broadcast doc is already plaintext).
documentFile($id) (#491) downloads a 'file' document's BYTES — the metadata methods don't include them. A broadcast (plaintext) document's bytes are returned as-is; a per-person / private document is encrypted to the recipient's key (not your service key), so documentFile fails clearly with documents.recipient_encrypted rather than a doomed decrypt. For a generated flow contract's own copy use flowRunDocument($runId) below (that copy IS service-key-encrypted).

Contract flows & identity (#491)

flowRunAnswers(FlowRun|string $run): array    // #491 gap 1 — a completed run's DECRYPTED answers {slug: plaintext}
flowRunDocument(string $runId): string        // #491 gap 2 — the company's own copy of a run's generated contract (plaintext bytes)
identity(): array                             // #491 gap 3 — this client's {company_user_id, service_id}

flowRunAnswers($run) returns a completed run's decrypted {slug => plaintext} answers (accepts a fetched FlowRun or a run id). It is the public accessor for a finished run's answers, which processFlowRun returns untouched.
flowRunDocument($runId) downloads the company's own service-key-encrypted copy of a run's generated contract and returns the plaintext file bytes (404 until the run generates a document) — the honest completion step (fill → complete → flowRunAnswers → flowRunDocument).
identity() returns this client's {company_user_id, service_id} from GET /api/company-data/whoami, so a triggerFlowRun binding's company party can bind to company_user_id (the person party's user_id comes from the connection).

Example: a runnable website that drives a contract flow end-to-end through these calls — trigger, type-checked step filling, a person turn on the phone, then the decrypted answers + downloaded document — is in the flow section of examples/: one command (composer start) and a browser. See its README.

`updateDocumentStatus` / `updateDocumentMetadata` / `deleteDocument`

updateDocumentStatus(string $documentId, string $status): Document
updateDocumentMetadata(string $documentId, ?array $metadata = null, ?string $name = null, ?string $description = null): Document
deleteDocument(string $documentId): void

$client->updateDocumentStatus($documentId, 'ready_to_sign');   // offering | ready_to_sign | active | active_but_ending | ended
$client->updateDocumentMetadata($documentId, name: 'Service Agreement (rev B)', metadata: ['ref' => 'AGR-2026-118b']);
$client->deleteDocument($documentId);                          // also removes the on-disk file

updateDocumentStatus moves a document through its lifecycle (offering → ready_to_sign → active → active_but_ending → ended).
updateDocumentMetadata updates name, description, and/or metadata — pass at least one (else ConfigError).
deleteDocument deletes the document and its stored file.
A contract-flow-generated document can also read waiting — a run-participant copy whose signer has not been reached yet in the run's ordered signing plan. It is read-only: updateDocumentStatus throws with error_key: 'documents.run_managed' (409) if you try to write status on a run-participant document while it is waiting, ready_to_sign or offering — that status moves only through flow generation, the run's own advance, sign/accept, or a run cancel/decline. A run-participant document's runSignatures property carries the run's ordered signature summary.

Reacting to a status change in the pump

When a document's lifecycle status changes, the feed/webhook emits a document_status_changed Change carrying documentId + the new status (and the usual personId / shareCode / at). A transition to active additionally carries sealedAt, plainSha256, signerFirstName, signerLastName and signerNameVerified — the same seal state the document read carries, so you never need a follow-up document($id) call just to learn a run sealed. Handle it alongside your field events:

$client->processChanges(function (\Allus\CompanyData\Model\Change $change): void {
    if (alreadyProcessed($change->id)) {
        return;
    }
    match ($change->event) {
        'field_updated'           => store($change->personId, $change->slug, $change->value),
        'document_status_changed' => onDocumentStatus($change->documentId, $change->status, $change->personId),
        default                   => null,
    };
    markProcessed($change->id);
});

Messaging

Your service can hold a conversation with a connected person — the same messaging surface the person already uses, with your service as the counterpart. Two shapes:

1-on-1 — sendMessage($connectionId, $text). End-to-end encrypted: the SDK encrypts one copy to the person's public key and one to your service key before anything leaves the process, so the person reads it in their app and you can re-read your own outbound text. The platform stores ciphertext only.
Broadcast — broadcastMessage($text). One plaintext message to every person connected to the service (one body cannot be single-key-encrypted to all of them, exactly as for a broadcast document). It seeds each person's ordinary 1-on-1 thread; their reply comes back end-to-end encrypted.

sendMessage answers 201 with the created message carrying message_id, and returns that id — the value you hand back as the acknowledgement boundary.

Inbound messages arrive on the changes pump / webhook as a message_received event — a person→company message only. A broadcast raises no event of its own.

$client->processChanges(function (\Allus\CompanyData\Model\Change $change) use ($client): void {
    if ($change->event !== 'message_received') {
        return;
    }
    echo $change->personId, ': ', $change->messageBody, "\n";  // already decrypted for you

    // Reply on the same connection. personPublicKey rides the event, so no second
    // key lookup is needed.
    $client->sendMessage(
        $change->connectionId,
        "Thanks — we're on it.",
        personPublicKey: $change->personPublicKey,
    );

    // Acknowledge what you handled. REQUIRED: without it the message stays unread
    // forever, your unread count grows, and the person never sees a read receipt.
    // Sending a reply does NOT acknowledge anything.
    $client->markMessagesRead($change->connectionId, $change->messageId);
});

markMessagesRead is bounded by the boundary message: a message that arrived while you were working is not swept, and a repeat is a no-op. The boundary must be a message the person sent on that connection — anything else is refused with an ApiError carrying company_data.ack_boundary_invalid (400).

// One plaintext announcement to everyone connected to the service.
$client->broadcastMessage("We're closed on Friday.");

Refusals surface as ApiError carrying the platform error_key:

`error_key`	Status	Meaning
`messages.messaging_not_entitled`	403	The company's plan does not include messaging.
`messages.not_connected`	403	The person is not connected to this service.
`messages.messaging_suspended`	403	Messaging is suspended for this service (or the whole company).
`messages.broadcast_suspended`	403	Broadcast alone is suspended for this service.
`messages.encryption_required`	400	A 1-on-1 body was not a valid encrypted wrapper.
`messages.broadcast_audience_too_large`	422	The service has more connections than a broadcast allows.
`messages.rate_limited`	429	Too many 1-on-1 messages to the same person.
`company_data.ack_boundary_invalid`	400	The ack boundary is not a message the person sent on that connection.

The typed value model

You work with these objects and nothing else (use Allus\CompanyData\Model\…):

RequestField { slug, label, type, oneTime, mandatory, verified, verifiedMaxAgeDays }
Connection   { id, personId, displayName, connectedAt, values: array<slug, Value> }
Value        { value, live, updatedAt, verified, verifiedAt, verifiedExpiresAt,
               verifiedMethod, verifiedProvider, verificationId }
Change       { id, event, personId, slug?, value?, live?, at }
LogEntry     { type, message, metadata, at }

All model properties are public readonly.

Keyed by your slug

$conn->values['work_email']->value → "alice@acme.com". The key is the stable, explicit slug you set per request field in the portal — rename the label freely, the slug is the contract. The person's source field is never exposed: no source slug, no field_id, not even via ->raw.

`Value`

Property	Meaning
`value`	The typed plaintext (see the table below).
`live`	`true` if the person chose "keep connected" (auto-updates); `false` for a one-time snapshot.
`updatedAt`	`?DateTimeImmutable` of when this answer last changed (per-answer, rides on the `Value`).
`verified`	`true` only when the verification hash recomputes over the decrypted plaintext and the verification has not lapsed. Absent metadata reads `false`, which means "not attested", not "wrong".
`verifiedAt`	`?DateTimeImmutable` the answering field was verified. A stamp, not a promise about today.
`verifiedExpiresAt`	`?DateTimeImmutable` that verification lapses; `null` when it does not. A document-backed verification dies with the document; once this is past, `verified` reads `false`.
`verifiedMethod`	HOW allme bound the value: `email_code` \| `sms_code` \| `sumsub_id` \| `sumsub_address`.
`verifiedProvider`	WHO established the proof: `allme` \| `sumsub`.
`verificationId`	The proof id to quote back to allme in a dispute — it resolves the full record, including facts you never receive.

The last three are the proof metadata and arrive together or not at all: a value bound before the proof log existed carries the four verification keys and none of these, so all three read null. They are readable whatever the verified boolean says — that boolean stays the only trust decision.

Value types — from the type's RESOLVED definition

A contact-field TYPE is a ROW in the served field-type registry, not a name this SDK knows by heart. The client fetches that registry (GET /api/contact-field-types) beside your request-field catalog and holds it for its life; a value's shape follows the type's resolved storage LANE and PRIMITIVE, so a type added as a row types itself with no SDK release.

The type's resolved…	PHP `value`
storage lane `photo` / `document`	a lazy `BinaryHandle` — see below
primitive `composite`	`array` — the decrypted plaintext is a JSON object, parsed for you
primitive `date`	`DateTimeImmutable` (date-only, UTC midnight; falls back to the raw string if it can't be parsed)
primitive `multilist`	`array` of the chosen option strings
anything else, and a type the registry does not carry	`string`
unanswered / no value	`null`

For the seeded types that means, unchanged: email/phone/url/text → string (phone is a single E.164-style string, + and digits); country/nationality → string, an ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code (e.g. 'US', 'NL'), not a display name; address/bank/creditcard → array; date/date_of_birth → DateTimeImmutable; photo, document, legal_document and the ID-document subtypes passport, photo_id, drivers_license → a lazy BinaryHandle.

An address's country/state sub-fields are an ISO alpha-2 code / USPS 2-letter state code respectively. $client->fieldTypes()->isFieldValueValid($type, $value) validates a plaintext against its type; FieldValidation::isValidCountryCode($code) / FieldValidation::dialCodeFor($code) check a code or look up its E.164 dial code.

Reach the registry itself as $client->fieldTypes() for resolve(), accepts($requested, $actual), descendants(), isBinary(), labelFor(), ordered() and validate($type, $value) (null when valid, else the name of the first failing rule). A request row of a PARENT type MAY be answered by a field of any DESCENDANT — a legal_document slot can be answered with a passport — but that matching is the API's and stays there. The answer reaches you keyed by YOUR slug and typed by the SLOT's own type: the person's source field is never exposed, so there is no source slug, no field_id and no source type to resolve, not even via .raw. For a binary slot the API resolves slot → source → file itself, so the bytes you fetch are the answering field's whatever type that field carries.

A CHOICE type's options. select and multiselect carry no options of their own — a flow element supplies them — so validate / isFieldValueValid / fieldValueError take an optional third argument, the caller's own option list. The ROW's resolved options govern whenever it has any, else the supplied list, and never a merge of the two; $client->fieldTypes()->optionsFor($type, $options) answers exactly the domain the validator will enforce, or null when neither source has one. A choice with no domain at all is refused (rule name options_unavailable) rather than measured against an empty list. submitFlowAnswers passes the flow element's options for you.

$addr = $conn->values['home_address']->value;   // array, e.g. ['street' => '...', 'city' => '...', ...]
$dob  = $conn->values['birthday']->value;         // DateTimeImmutable

Binary fields — the lazy `BinaryHandle`

A photo/document value is a BinaryHandle. Nothing is fetched or decrypted until you call ->bytes(), ->pages(), ->metadata() or ->save():

$handle = $conn->values['passport_scan']->value;   // BinaryHandle (no network yet)

$pages = $handle->pages();                          // GET the slot file → every page, in order
$meta  = $handle->metadata();                       // the entries the type declares
$data  = $handle->bytes();                          // the primary file bytes (single-file answers)
$n     = $handle->save('/tmp/contract.pdf');        // same, written to disk; returns bytes written
echo $handle->valueUrl();                            // the opaque slot-keyed URL it fetches from

foreach ($pages as $page) {
    echo $page->label, ' ', $page->name, ' ', $page->mime, ' ', strlen($page->bytes), PHP_EOL;
}
echo $meta['document_number'] ?? '', ' ', $meta['expiry_date'] ?? '', ' ', $meta['name'] ?? '';

All four accessors share ONE lazy fetch of the slot-keyed file endpoint; the result is cached on the handle, so repeated calls don't re-fetch. ->save() writes crash-safely (temp file → fsync → atomic rename).

That endpoint has three 200 shapes and you cannot predict which one you get. It depends on whether the person's source field is private AND on the TYPE of the field they answered with — neither yours to choose, both changeable, and neither exposed:

answer	response	the handle does
private source	`application/json` · `{"encrypted": true, "value": <wrapper>}`	decrypt with your service key → the JSON ENVELOPE string
non-private source whose type stores pages or declares entries	`application/json` · `{"encrypted": false, "value": "<envelope>"}`	read that envelope string as-is; no key needed
every other non-private source	the file's own `Content-Type` · the body is the file	return the bytes as-is; no key needed

The SDK tells the raw-bytes shape apart on Content-Type and never by sniffing the body; inside a JSON body it is encrypted that decides. A plaintext answer works on a handle with no decrypt wiring at all.

The envelope is a photo's {"full": "data:…", "thumb": …}, a single-file document's {"file": "data:…", …}, or a multi-page document's {"pages": [{"label": …, "file": "data:…", …}], …}, with every declared entry beside it. ->bytes()/->save() throw DecryptError('multi-page envelope: use pages') on a multi-page envelope rather than handing back the front page as though it were the whole document — read ->pages() instead. ->metadata() carries no ordering guarantee; read the envelope string yourself if you need the declared order.

echo $handle->contentSha256();   // X-Allus-Content-Sha256 — the digest of the SERVED ARTIFACT
echo $handle->contentType();     // what the answer arrived as

The digest is over the raw bytes on the bytes shape and over the served value string on either JSON shape. A photo slot serves the authoritative image; there is no thumbnail variant to select.

A Share once answer's bytes are kept 90 days. Afterwards the slot still reads as answered but ->bytes() throws ApiError with status === 410 and errorKey === 'company_data.file_expired'; its ->details carry content_sha256 and expired_at, so you can still identify what you once held. The values map also gains content_sha256, and expired/expired_at after expiry, reachable on $value->raw; the field_deleted the expiry emits carries content_sha256 on $change->raw.

`Change`

A change-feed / webhook event.

Property	Meaning
`id`	The stable server change-row id — your dedup key (captured before the server delete).
`event`	`connection_created`, `connection_deleted`, `field_updated`, `field_deleted`, `consent_accepted`, `consent_declined`, `document_status_changed`, `message_received`.
`personId`	The person the change is about (may be `null`).
`shareCode`	The person's profile share code — present on every event (may be `null`).
`slug`, `value`, `live`	Present only on `field_updated`; `value` is typed exactly like `Value->value` (incl. a lazy `BinaryHandle` for binaries). Connection/consent events carry no slot/value.
`documentId`, `status`	Present only on `document_status_changed` — the document's id and its new lifecycle status.
`sealedAt`, `plainSha256`, `signerFirstName`, `signerLastName`, `signerNameVerified`	Present on a `document_status_changed` transition to `active` — the same seal state the document read carries. `null` otherwise.
`connectionId`, `messageId`, `personPublicKey`, `messageBody`	Present only on `message_received` — a person messaged your service. `messageBody` is the decrypted text. See Messaging.
`verified`, `verifiedAt`, `verifiedExpiresAt`	Present on `field_updated`, with the same meaning as on `Value`.
`verifiedMethod`, `verifiedProvider`, `verificationId`	The proof metadata, same meaning and same all-or-none rule as on `Value`.
`at`	`?DateTimeImmutable` of the change. (There is no separate `updatedAt` on a change.)

`->raw`

Every model carries ->raw — the underlying hardened API array — for debugging or an edge case the SDK didn't model. It still never contains the person's source field.

See docs/model.md for the full reference.

The changes pump

The changes feed is a server-side drain-on-fetch queue: GET /api/company-data/changes?limit=N returns up to N events (default 100, max 500) and deletes exactly those rows in the same transaction — no offset/cursor, and the API keeps no copy afterward. So consumption can't be a plain list: a consumer crash mid-batch would lose events the API already deleted, and a huge backlog must not materialize in memory. processChanges solves both.

Per run, repeating until the feed is empty then returning:

Replay first. Deliver any un-acked events already in the local buffer (from a previous crashed run), oldest-first.
Drain. When the buffer is empty, fetch one batch and persist it to the durable file buffer (fsync) BEFORE handing anything out. This is the backup the API no longer has.
Deliver one-by-one. For each buffered event, oldest-first: decrypt its value at delivery (never on disk), build the typed Change, call $handler.
Ack / retry / dead-letter. On success, remove the event from the buffer (ack). On a handler error, retry with backoff up to maxRetries; then either move it to the dead-letter store and continue (onError='deadletter', default — one poison event never wedges the stream) or stop and re-throw (onError='halt'). A DecryptError on a buffered event (corrupt/truncated ciphertext, rotated key) is dead-lettered immediately — re-decrypting can't fix it, so it does not burn retries (under onError='halt' it re-throws). Either way it never propagates out and wedges replay.
Repeat until a drain returns empty and the buffer is drained → return.

The durable buffer

Plain files under cache_dir (zero extra dependencies): pending/ for un-acked events, deadletter/ for ones that exhausted retries.
Stored events keep their ciphertext value — no plaintext PII is ever written to disk. Decryption happens only at delivery.
Writes are crash-safe (temp file → fsync → atomic rename → dir fsync). Files are named with a monotonic, zero-padded sequence so they replay oldest-first.

Crash safety, at-least-once, and idempotency

A batch is durably buffered before any delivery, and acked per-item only after the handler succeeds. The ack can't be atomic with your side-effects — a crash between your handler's success and its ack re-delivers that event on the next run. That makes delivery at-least-once, so:

Your handler must be idempotent. Dedup on Change->id.

Change->id is the stable server change-row id, captured before the server delete, so it survives crash + replay unchanged.

No follow mode

processChanges returns when the feed empties. You schedule re-runs — a cron job, a while (true) { $client->processChanges($handler); sleep(5); } loop, a worker queue, whatever fits. The feed is cheap to poll (see Rate limits).

Worked example

<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';

use Allus\CompanyData\Client;
use Allus\CompanyData\Model\Change;

$client = Client::fromConfig('allus.json');

$handle = function (Change $change): void {
    if (seen($change->id)) {          // idempotent: skip anything already applied
        return;
    }
    match ($change->event) {
        'field_updated'  => storeValue($change->personId, $change->slug, $change->value, $change->live),
        'field_deleted'  => clearValue($change->personId, $change->slug),
        'connection_deleted' => dropPerson($change->personId),
        'connection_created', 'consent_accepted', 'consent_declined'
                         => noteEvent($change->personId, $change->event, $change->at),
        default          => null,
    };
    recordSeen($change->id);
};

// Schedule your own re-runs; processChanges itself returns when empty.
while (true) {
    $client->processChanges($handle, batchSize: 200, maxRetries: 5);
    sleep(5);
}

If a handler keeps failing, the event lands in the dead-letter store instead of blocking the stream; inspect with $client->deadLetters() and re-drive with $client->retryDeadLetters($handle) after fixing the cause. See docs/pump.md.

Webhooks

Webhooks are the lower-latency push alternative to polling the changes feed. The platform POSTs each change event to your configured webhook URL with:

X-Allus-Webhook-Id — which webhook this is (selects the HMAC secret from config).
X-Allus-Signature — HMAC-SHA256(rawBody, secret) as lowercase hex.
the body — the same slug-keyed Change shape as the pull feed (JSON or XML).

All secrets/keys come from config; the helpers take no key or secret arguments. Use the raw request body bytes (do not re-serialize a parsed body — the HMAC is over the exact bytes the platform sent, and the SDK parses XML in an XXE-safe way over those raw bytes).

In a web route — framework-agnostic (raw PHP)

<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';

use Allus\CompanyData\Client;
use Allus\CompanyData\Errors\WebhookError;

$client = Client::fromConfig('allus.json');

$rawBody = file_get_contents('php://input');
$headers = function_exists('getallheaders') ? getallheaders() : [];   // ['X-Allus-Signature' => '…', …]

try {
    $change = $client->handleWebhook($rawBody, $headers);
} catch (WebhookError) {
    http_response_code(401);   // bad / unknown signature, or unparseable envelope
    exit;
}

applyChange($change);   // see "Delivery contract" below before adding dedup
http_response_code(200);   // 200 — the ONLY status allus counts as delivered

If you only have $_SERVER (no getallheaders()), reconstruct the headers the SDK needs — it only reads X-Allus-Webhook-Id and X-Allus-Signature (lookup is case-insensitive):

$headers = [
    'X-Allus-Webhook-Id' => $_SERVER['HTTP_X_ALLUS_WEBHOOK_ID'] ?? '',
    'X-Allus-Signature'  => $_SERVER['HTTP_X_ALLUS_SIGNATURE'] ?? '',
];

In a PSR-7 route (e.g. Slim)

use Psr\Http\Message\ServerRequestInterface as Request;
use Psr\Http\Message\ResponseInterface as Response;
use Allus\CompanyData\Errors\WebhookError;

$app->post('/allus/webhook', function (Request $request, Response $response) use ($client) {
    $rawBody = (string) $request->getBody();
    // PSR-7 getHeaders() returns array<string, string[]>; the SDK looks up
    // X-Allus-* case-insensitively and takes the first value of an array.
    try {
        $change = $client->handleWebhook($rawBody, $request->getHeaders());
    } catch (WebhookError) {
        return $response->withStatus(401);
    }
    applyChange($change);
    return $response->withStatus(200);
});

verifyWebhook / parseWebhook let you split the steps if you prefer:

if (!$client->verifyWebhook($rawBody, $headers)) {
    http_response_code(401);
    exit;
}
$change = $client->parseWebhook($rawBody, $headers);

Delivery contract — effectively unique, rarely replayed

Each queued event is POSTed once, and only HTTP 200 counts as delivered — a 202, a 204, a 3xx redirect and every 4xx/5xx are all treated as a failure. On anything other than 200 (or a timeout or connection error) the event is not retried in place: it and the rest of the webhook's queue move to a durable server-side backlog and the webhook is marked bad. The backlog is delivered later, either automatically when the webhook next probes healthy, or when you drain it yourself with GET /api/company-data/changes?webhook_id=… (delete-on-read).

So deliveries are effectively unique — with one rare exception. If your endpoint processed an event but the platform never saw your 200 (your response timed out, or you crashed after committing but before responding), the event is treated as failed and replayed on recovery, so you receive it again. Nothing caps that at two: a failed probe leaves its backlog row in place, so every later recovery attempt whose 200 is likewise lost replays the same event once more. Inside that window the contract is at-least-once — plan for one or more repeats, not for exactly one.

Do not use $change->id as an idempotency key here. On the webhook path the id is neither reliably stable nor reliably fresh, and a receiver cannot tell which one it is holding. A live delivery is built with no change row behind it, so its id is minted for that single POST — the later replay of the same event is rebuilt from a durable backlog row and therefore carries a different id. But a replayed delivery carries that row's id, and the row stays in place until it is delivered successfully, so a re-attempted replay arrives with the same id — which changes again if the event is re-backlogged after a further failure. An id check therefore misses the duplicate you are most likely to see and matches only a rarer one; it is not a contract. If you need strict idempotency, key on the content — event + person + slug/document + payload — never on the id.

Webhooks and the pull feed are alternative integrations — consume one, never both. The id-dedup guidance under The changes pump applies to the pump only, where $change->id is the real server change-row id.

Config-driven secrets

Per-webhook HMAC secrets live in the config webhooks map, keyed by webhook id; the SDK reads X-Allus-Webhook-Id off the request and looks up the matching secret. A single-webhook service can use the flat "webhook_secret": "…" shortcut (or ALLUS_WEBHOOK_SECRET). An unknown/unconfigured id ⇒ verification returns false (and handleWebhook throws WebhookError).

The `encrypt_payload` account-key envelope

If a webhook has encrypt_payload enabled, the body is replaced by a {"_enc":1,…} envelope encrypted to your company account key (and the HMAC is over that envelope — the final bytes sent). parseWebhook/handleWebhook unwrap it transparently using the configured account_private_key + account_passphrase, then decrypt the inner field value with the service key — so an encrypted-payload Change is identical to a plain one. If you receive such a webhook without an account_private_key configured, you get a WebhookError.

The account-key envelope uses OAEP-SHA1 (OpenSSL's default), distinct from the OAEP-SHA256 used for person field values — the SDK handles this difference internally; you only supply the account key in config.

See docs/webhooks.md.

Rate limits

Endpoint	Limit	Use it for
`changes` (the pump)	generous	Poll as often as you like — it's a cheap drain-on-fetch queue.
`request-fields`, `logs`	moderate	Occasional reads.
`connections`, `connection(id)`, binary `/file`	heavily limited	Initial full sync + occasional reconciliation only — never as a poll substitute.

A 429 carries Retry-After. The SDK backs off and retries automatically:

The transport (HttpClient) retries a 429 a bounded number of times honoring Retry-After, then throws RateLimitError.
The connections(...) generator additionally backs off per Retry-After on a surfaced RateLimitError and retries the page a bounded number of times before re-throwing — so it paces itself within the limit instead of hammering.

If you catch a RateLimitError, its ->retryAfter is the seconds to wait (or null when the header was absent).

Your client_credentials token requests (/oauth2/token) are on their own rate-limit bucket, separate from person logins — but it is keyed by source IP, not by your client_id, so it is shared with every other client_credentials caller reaching the API from the same address (another service on your network, a second client on the same host). Caching the token, as described under How it's wired below, is what keeps that shared window from being spent needlessly — by you or anyone else behind the same IP. Every rate-limit refusal — this 429, and the platform's 503 when its own limiter store is unreadable — now carries a populated ->errorKey, readable off the same RateLimitError/ApiError.

Errors

All under Allus\CompanyData\Errors\…. Same taxonomy + names across all six SDKs.

Error	When
`ConfigError`	Missing/invalid config, unreadable key file, or wrong passphrase — at construction (fail fast).
`AuthError`	Token fetch/refresh failed (bad `client_id`/`secret`, revoked client); or a 401 survives the one automatic refresh-and-retry.
`ApiError`	Any non-2xx from the API; carries `->status`, `->errorKey` (when present), and the message.
`DecryptError`	A ciphertext wrapper is malformed, the key is wrong, or the GCM tag mismatches. Surfaces when a value is accessed/decrypted.
`WebhookError`	Signature verification failed, or an envelope couldn't be unwrapped/parsed.
`RateLimitError`	A 429 from a rate-limited endpoint. Subclass of `ApiError` (status fixed at 429); carries `->retryAfter` (seconds, or `null`).

use Allus\CompanyData\Client;
use Allus\CompanyData\Errors\{ConfigError, AuthError, ApiError, DecryptError, WebhookError, RateLimitError};

try {
    $client = Client::fromConfig('allus.json');
    foreach ($client->connections() as $conn) {
        // …
    }
} catch (ConfigError $e) {
    // fix the config / key file
} catch (RateLimitError $e) {
    waitSeconds($e->retryAfter ?? 60);
} catch (ApiError $e) {
    log($e->status, $e->errorKey, $e->getMessage());
}

ApiError/RateLimitError are not final (the latter extends the former); ConfigError, AuthError, DecryptError, WebhookError are final.

See docs/errors.md.

How it's wired

Everything below is what the SDK hides so your code only ever sees conclusions.

Auth / token. An HttpClient owns a client_credentials-only token. On the first call (or when the cached token nears expiry) it POSTs client_id/client_secret to {api_url}/oauth2/token and caches the bearer token + its expiry; refresh is automatic. A mid-flight 401 triggers exactly one refresh-and-retry, then AuthError. The token is scoped server-side to one service, so every call is implicitly that service's data. The HTTP layer goes through a small Transport seam (CurlTransport by default; tests inject a fake).

Regions. The configured api_url is the platform's global front door and also the starting point for every request, including the token request. A client_credentials token is minted at your company's home region, and the token response names that region's base in an api_url member — the SDK stores it and sends every subsequent request there, token requests included, because the token is valid only at that region and a company that moves region is followed by the next mint. A data call that still reaches the front door is refused with 421 + error_key: region.rebase_required, carrying the same api_url; the SDK stores it and retries the call exactly once. The SDK does not validate a server-returned api_url against anything — it stores the base the server names and uses it. An absent or empty api_url is never stored and the response surfaces as the error it is.

Slug resolution. requestFields() is fetched once and cached; its slug→type map types every value (so address parses to an array, photo becomes a lazy binary handle, etc.). A value or a change naming a slug that map does not carry — a request slot configured after the client started — refetches the catalog ONCE, and a slug still absent afterwards is remembered and never asked for again. The connection/changes endpoints return values keyed by your request slug — the person's source field is dropped server-side and never reaches the SDK.

Decryption (zero-knowledge). The service private key is loaded once at construction from the configured encrypted PEM + passphrase into an in-memory phpseclib RSA key. A decryptValue closure over it is handed to every model factory and the pump — the key never appears in a method signature. Each value is a hybrid wrapper ({"_enc":1,"k":rsa_oaep_sha256(aesKey),"iv":…,"d":aes256gcm(…)}); the SDK RSA-OAEP-SHA256 (MGF1-SHA256) unwraps the AES key via phpseclib (PHP's openssl_private_decrypt can only do SHA-1 OAEP), then AES-256-GCM decrypts the payload via the openssl ext. The platform only ever holds ciphertext — it never sees your plaintext.

Binary fetch. A binary value is a lazy BinaryHandle over a slot-keyed value_url (slot-keyed, never source-field-keyed). On ->bytes()/->save() it GETs that file endpoint and branches on the response Content-Type: an application/json {"encrypted":true,"value":<wrapper>} envelope runs the same service-key decrypt to a JSON file-envelope and base64-decodes its data URI, while any other content type IS the file and is returned untouched. The body is never sniffed — reading a wrapper as bytes would write ciphertext to disk with no error, so the ambiguous case (no Content-Type at all) resolves to the JSON path, which fails loudly instead.

The drain-on-fetch feed. processChanges delegates to a Pump wired to a fetchChanges closure (GET /changes?limit=, returning raw ciphertext events) and a decrypt closure (builds a typed Change). Because the fetch deletes the rows it returns, the pump persists each batch to the durable file buffer (ciphertext at rest) before delivery, acks per-item after your handler succeeds, and replays the buffer on restart — see The changes pump.

XML safety. When format: "xml", responses (and webhook bodies) are parsed with a hardened DOMDocument (XXE-safe: LIBXML_NONET, DOCTYPE rejected, no entity substitution). The webhook HMAC is always computed over the raw bytes, never the parsed tree.

Development

composer install        # pulls phpseclib3 + phpunit
composer test           # vendor/bin/phpunit

The test suite proves crypto parity with the other five SDKs against a shared, cross-language decryption fixture: it loads the PBES2 service PEM, decrypts a text wrapper to its known plaintext, and decrypts a binary wrapper through the envelope to the expected inner-bytes hash. It also runs an independent openssl CLI cross-check, so the crypto is proven platform-correct, not merely self-consistent.

Sign in with allme (OAuth, #195)

use Allus\CompanyData\OAuthClient;

$oauth = OAuthClient::fromConfig('idw-config.json');
$url = $oauth->authorizeUrl('signin', state: $state, codeChallenge: $ch);
// ...user approves; your redirect receives ?code=...
$res = $oauth->completeSignIn($code, $verifier); // $res['user'], $res['mode'], $res['values'], $res['values_cipher'], $res['attestations']

Modes: signin | one_time (claim values decrypted for you) | connect | 2fa_enroll (opt a person into 2FA — see below). pollResult($state) drives the detached mode.

#498 — a claim IS a request field. You describe what you need and the person picks which of their own fields answers it; you never name a field. A claim carries a mandatory unique name (everything that comes back is keyed by it — values, values_cipher, attestations, and their stored choice for a repeat login), a field type, an optional suggested slug, required, and verified ("only a #311-verified answer will do"). A nameless or duplicate claim raises a config error at the call rather than failing at the API. verified is accepted only on the OIDC flow and only for a type allme can verify (today email); elsewhere it is refused with invalid_request rather than quietly dropped.

verifiedMaxAgeDays narrows a verified claim to a RECENT verification, and the merge is tighten-only: the app's registered configuration is a FLOOR, a request may only tighten it, and the effective limit is the minimum of the two stated ages. An omitted age tightens nothing — omitting it sends nothing at all, never an explicit null — and a value below 1 raises ConfigError at the call.

The sign-in result carries values, values_cipher and attestations.

sub is the person's share code and equals share_code — byte-identical to the id_token's sub. display_name is gone: ask for a name claim and read the value under that key.
values_cipher is an additive sibling of values, keyed the same way: the raw app-key ciphertext wrapper each plaintext value was decrypted from, exactly as userinfo delivered it. Lets you show that a value really came from encrypted delivery rather than trusting it verbatim. Empty for a mode/claim that carries no ciphertext (signin, or plaintext delivery) — that emptiness is the honest answer.
attestations is an additive sibling map keyed by the same claim name, present only for a verified claim under encrypted delivery. Each entry carries a verified boolean the SDK computes itself, in constant time, over the plaintext it just decrypted — plus the raw hash/salt/verifiedAt/verifiedExpiresAt, and the proof metadata verifiedMethod/verifiedProvider/verificationId read from the opened seal (HOW the value was bound, by WHOM, and the id to quote back to allme in a dispute — all three together or not at all; a seal built before the proof log existed carries none of them and every one reads null). A slug ABSENT from the map is "not attested", never "wrong" (treat that value as unverified); an entry present with verified false is a MISMATCH and you must reject the value. verifiedAt attests the value as verified at that moment, not verified today; verifiedExpiresAt is when that verification lapses on its own (null = it does not), and an expired attestation is unverified — the computed verified already reads false once it has passed.

resolveUserinfo($accessToken, $fallbackMode = null) is the second half of completeSignIn — the userinfo read + decrypt + attest, without the token exchange — for a caller whose exchange already ran through a different client (a standards-only third-party OIDC library, say, that verified the id_token itself but cannot read a claim value the id_token never carries). Config-only key handling applies exactly as it does to completeSignIn: you pass no key or passphrase, only the access token you already hold. Returns the identical shape (values, values_cipher, attestations) and carries the same mismatch-rejection duty on the caller. completeSignIn is implemented on top of this method. $fallbackMode is used only when userinfo itself omits mode — pass the mode your own token response carried, or null if you have none.

2FA by allme (#436, #481)

Ask a connected person to approve a login inside the allme app. On the same service data client (no new config), via the twoFactor() sub-client:

use Allus\CompanyData\Client;

$client = Client::fromConfig('allus.json');

// Raise a challenge. The idempotency key is REQUIRED — a repeat with the same key within the TTL returns
// the SAME challenge and sends no second push. The context is plain text shown on the person's card.
$ch = $client->twoFactor()->challenge('2I6UF3', 'login-8f3c1a', 'Sign-in from Chrome');
if ($ch->matchingDigits !== null) {                // number matching is on for this service
    showOnLoginPage($ch->matchingDigits);          // the person types these back into the app; the server checks them
}

// Wait for the terminal outcome — polls result() for you (defaults: 600s timeout, 2s interval),
// throws ApiError on timeout.
$res = $client->twoFactor()->waitForResult($ch->challengeId); // or result($ch->challengeId) to poll once yourself
if ($res->status === 'approved') {
    grantLogin();
}

Burn-on-read. The first read of a terminal state (approved | denied | expired | revoked) delivers it and burns it — a later read is gone. Read it once and persist your own outcome; waitForResult returns that first terminal read and never re-reads a consumed challenge.
Webhook variant. The 2fa_challenge_completed change/webhook carries the same terminal status, so a webhook consumer need not poll. Expiry fires no webhook/Change — only approved/denied/revoked reach the feed, so a lapsed challenge is observable only by polling.
Enrollment. Only an enrolled person can be challenged (an un-enrolled share_code is 404). Enrollment is a one-time consent on the web.allme.fyi/auth surface via the OAuth helper's 2fa_enroll mode — a redirect button ($oauth->authorizeUrl('2fa_enroll', state: $state)), or server-to-server with responseMode: 'detached' + pollResult($state), which returns ['enrolled' => true, 'state' => ...] once the person confirms.
Errors. 404 (unknown / not-enrolled share code). A 429 is either the plain rate limit (retried with backoff → RateLimitError) or twofa.pending_cap (too many challenges already open for this person) — the latter surfaces immediately as ApiError and is never retried, since a retry cannot clear it.

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